Suchergebnisse

1. Introduction: Yuko Kasuya, S. 1 . - 2. A Framework for Analysing Presidential-Legislative Relations in Asia: Yuko Kasuya, S. 10. - 3. Presidentialism in Korea: A Strong President and a Weak Government: Yuki Asaba,S. 40 . - 4. Afghanistan's Strong President and Weak Parties: Yuko Kasuya with John Kendall, S. 59 . - 5. Trading Compromises: Interaction of Powers in the Philippine Presidential System: Takeshi Kawanaka, S. 89. - 6. Presidential Strength and Party Leadership in Taiwan: Mitsutoyo Matsumoto, S. 107 . - 7. Strong President and Vulnerable Political System in Sri Lanka: Hiroki Miwa, S. 134 . - 8. President Restrained: Effects of Parliamentary Rule and Coalition Government on Indonesia's Presidentialism: Koichi Kawamura, S. 156 . - 9. Conclusion: Lessons from the Study of Asian Presidentialism: Yuko Kasuya, S. 204

This introduction to the special issue highlights the key findings and implications of democratic backsliding in Southeast Asia. It begins with an overview of the region's democratic landscape using the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset and compares the patterns and modes of backsliding in six selected cases. Collectively, the articles suggest the importance of unpacking regime components and the growing attitudinal elite-mass gap in analyzing the quality of democracy. The liberalization effects of social media were found to be mixed. The theoretical and empirical findings offer a fertile ground for future comparative work beyond the region.

Why do some electoral authoritarian regimes survive for decades while others become democracies? This article explores the impact of constitutional structures on democratic transitions from electoral authoritarianism. We argue that under electoral authoritarian regimes, parliamentary systems permit dictators to survive longer than they do in presidential systems. This is because parliamentary systems incentivize autocrats and ruling elites to engage in power sharing and thus institutionalize party organizations, and indirectly allow electoral manipulation to achieve an overwhelming victory at the ballot box, through practices such as gerrymandering and malapportionment. We test our hypothesis using a combination of cross-national statistical analysis and comparative case studies of Malaysia and the Philippines. Employing a cross-national dataset of 170 countries between 1946 and 2008, dynamic probit models provide supporting evidence that electoral authoritarianism within parliamentary systems is less likely to lead a country to democracy than within presidential systems. The results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including instrumental variable estimation and additional controls. Two carefully selected case studies have been chosen for comparative analysis—Malaysia's Barisan National (National Front) regime (1957 to present) and the Philippines's electoral authoritarian regime (1978 to 1986)—which elucidate causal mechanisms in the theory.